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Carrying Forward NATO’s Deterrence Review:  
A Report on a Workshop in Brussels,
25-26 October 2011
O
n 25-26 October 2011 the Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung and the NATO 
Defense College co-sponsored a workshop in Brussels concerning 
the issues at stake in NATO’s ongoing Deterrence and Defense Po-
sture Review (DDPR).  The NATO Allies chartered the DDPR in the 
November 2010 Lisbon Summit Declaration.
1
  They have agreed to present the 
findings of the DDPR at the May 2012 Chicago Summit.
The main points raised in the workshop discussions were as follows:
• The precise contents of the “appropriate mix” of conventional, nuclear, 
and missile defense capabilities envisaged in the Lisbon Summit Declara-
tion have yet to be identified.  Costs stand out as an important factor.
• Missile defense capabilities promise to enhance the Alliance’s security, 
but they cannot provide a threat of retaliation for effective deterrence and 
war-prevention.  Missile defenses and nuclear weapons represent qualita-
tively different capabilities and have different deterrent effects.
•The capacity of conventional military forces to provide reliable deterrence 
is limited, notably in comparison with the deterrence potential of nuclear 
weapons.  The contribution of conventional forces to deterrence may be 
particularly modest in a context in which NATO governments are cutting 
defense spending, owing to the continuing financial crisis.
• Participants differed as to whether the Allies could prudently reduce 
their reliance on nuclear deterrence by enhancing their conventional mili-
tary capabilities and developing and deploying missile defenses.  
• Addressing the security concerns of NATO Allies in Central and Eastern 
* Professor, U.S. Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California, and a Guest Scholar at the NATO 
Defense College. The views expressed are the author’s alone and do not represent those of the 
Department of the Navy or any U.S. government agency, or of NATO or any of its member governments.
1  “NATO will maintain an appropriate mix of conventional, nuclear, and missile defence forces . . . 
We have tasked the Council to continue to review NATO’s overall posture in deterring and defen-
ding against the full range of threats to the Alliance, taking into account changes in the evolving 
international security environment . . . Essential elements of the review would include the range of 
NATO’s strategic capabilities required, including NATO’s nuclear posture, and missile defence and 
other means of strategic deterrence and defence. This only applies to nuclear weapons assigned 
to NATO.” North Atlantic Council, Lisbon Summit Declaration, 20 November 2010, par. 30, available 
at http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_68828.htm?mode=pressrelease
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Europe will be a key task for the DDPR.  This might 
be accomplished through a mix of long-standing 
capabilities and improved crisis management 
instruments.
• The DDPR has raised fundamental questions about 
solidarity within the Alliance.
• Some NATO European observers have expressed in-
terest in U.S. extended deterrence relationships with 
allies in the Asia-Pacific as a possible model for NATO 
in the future.  At the same time U.S. allies in Northeast 
Asia are looking to NATO as a model for consultations 
and associated extended deterrence arrangements.
• Participants agreed as to the importance of risk- and 
responsibility-sharing for deterrence and Alliance co-
hesion, but differed as to the specific requirements of 
this principle.
• The European allies are divided as to the require-
ments of sustaining a credible Alliance nuclear deter-
rence posture.
• Some participants questioned the political-military 
utility of the remaining U.S. nuclear weapons in Euro-
pe, while others saw continuing security value in the 
weapons and associated arrangements, notably in ex-
ceptional crisis management situations.
• There was consensus as to the continuing importan-
ce of nuclear deterrence for the Alliance’s security, but 
participants differed as to the security contribution of 
U.S. nuclear weapons in Europe.
• Participants disagreed as to whether it would be le-
gally possible and strategically prudent to revise the 
Alliance’s declaratory policy by including a negative 
security assurance (NSA) similar to the NSAs recently 
articulated by the United Kingdom and the United Sta-
tes.
• Some participants argued that transparency and 
confidence-building measures constitute the first step 
toward further Russian-U.S. nuclear arms control and 
disarmament agreements.
• Some participants said that the removal of the remai-
ning U.S. nuclear weapons in Europe would promote 
the Alliance’s nuclear nonproliferation objectives, whi-
le others questioned this judgment.
• The prospects for further Russian-U.S. negotiations 
on nuclear arms control and disarmament are challen-
ging, owing in part to Russian policies.
• Disagreements among the NATO Allies may also com-
plicate the pursuit of further Russian-U.S. negotiations 
on nuclear arms control and disarmament.
• NATO Heads of State and Government meeting in 
Chicago in May 2012 may decide that the DDPR issues 
deserve further study.
The following report elaborates on these key conclusions.
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A German participant said that the Alliance’s foreign mi-
nisters agreed on a work plan in April 2011 that includes 
options for nuclear, conventional, and missile defense ca-
pabilities.  The process has, he said, been “dynamic and ex-
tremely delicate,” but “successful so far.”
A German participant said that his country is committed to 
the principles of “cooperative security” found in the 2010 
Strategic Concept, notably the principle of relying on “the 
lowest possible level of forces” while ensuring “undimini-
shed security for all Alliance members.” 
2
  In his view, the 
prospective changes in NATO’s military capabilities, nota-
bly in missile defense, raise the possibility of a new mix of 
conventional and nuclear forces.
  
A Turkish participant said, “Deterrence is a value, or a qua-
lity of perception, which changes as a function of an op-
ponent’s subjective judgment of the Alliance’s capabilities 
and its demonstrable resolve to use them.  So, the bottom 
line is, we are not facing a simple equation. It is not con-
ventional, plus nuclear, plus missile defense is equal to de-
terrence and deterrence being a constant value, so that, if 
you have more of missile defense, you can downscale your 
nuclear and conventional capabilities. Deterrence is a flu-
id subjective quality in the eye of the beholder. Therefore, 
there are a multitude of factors that affect its credibility 
other than hardware.  That is perhaps why the DDPR has 
become a more complicated undertaking than previously 
envisaged.”  
2 North Atlantic Council, Active Engagement, Modern Defence:  Strategic Concept for the Defence and Security of the Members of the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organisation, 19 November 2010, par. 26, available at http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_68580.htm
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A British participant said that conventional forces carry “a 
considerable price tag,” and that by comparison nuclear 
forces are “already paid for.”
An American participant said that not all the costs of nu-
clear forces are “sunk.”  For example, the B-61 life extension 
program has yet to be paid for.
A German participant said that it is “not that inexpensive” 
to modernize nuclear assets, and that “budget constraints 
could go many ways.”
A French participant said that “The affordability issue is 
very important.”  The Allies must, he said, “be realistic” and 
recognize that the nuclear weapons are “already there.”
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With regard to missile defense, an American participant 
said that “The United States is committed to doing our 
part – deploying all four phases of the European Phased 
Adaptive Approach.  But this, too, must be a shared effort. 
Recent decisions and announcements in this regard by Po-
land, Romania, Turkey, Spain, the Netherlands, and France 
are most welcome and most encouraging.  And of course 
we are also committed to continue to try to persuade Rus-
sia to work constructively with NATO to develop a coope-
rative framework that inter-connects our respective missi-
le defense forces where appropriate and helps to protect 
us all.”
Another American participant said that neither the Allies 
nor Russia have yet reached a “comfort level” about pro-
spects for cooperation on missile defense, and quoted 
Karl-Heinz Kamp’s recent observation that “NATO, Russia 
and Missile Defence mark a triangle which contains poli-
tical promises but also the danger of failure and friction.” 
3
 
The United States cannot give Russia the legally binding 
commitments as to the intended purposes and capabili-




A French participant said that “missile defense could con-
tribute to deterrence in some ways but cannot provide a 
substitute for Alliance nuclear deterrence.”  This is because, 
while missile defense offers “protection in case of an at-
tack,” it “cannot provide the threat of retaliation that nucle-
ar weapons represent.”  Moreover, missile defense cannot 
offer the same level of existential risk- and responsibility-
sharing among Allies as nuclear weapons can.  Therefore, 
he said, “missile defense will not be the new glue of the 
Alliance.”
A Turkish participant said that “missile defense could in-
crease the effectiveness and operational flexibility of con-
ventional capabilities by contributing to their survivability. 
This could, in turn, allow us to forward deploy conventio-
nal forces, which would be a visible demonstration of the 
Alliance’s resolve and contribute to deterrence as a whole. 
The deterrent value of missile defense is more due to its 
contribution to the effectiveness of our conventional ca-
pabilities and thus to our conventional deterrence, rather 
than its own self-standing deterrence.”
 
This Turkish participant raised a question:  “Could missile 
defense allow us to reduce the role and number of sub-
strategic nuclear weapons, without compromising our de-
terrence, and hence, our security?  I would say ‘no,’ simply 
because we are talking about two qualitatively different 
capabilities. We should free ourselves from the conceptual 
straightjacket of linking qualitatively different capabilities 
with one another and instead assess them on their own 
merits and in light of the strategic environment.  In doing 
so, we should take into account the contribution of current 
nuclear sharing arrangements to Alliance cohesion, the 
transatlantic link and visible assurances as well as the un-
predictable nature of the strategic security environment.”
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An American participant said that “the view that conven-
tional weapons can replace many nuclear missions and 
will increasingly provide for future deterrence is almost 
becoming received wisdom, despite the fact that there 
is little analytic basis for this assumption.  Conventional 
deterrence on its own has never been demonstrated to 
3 Karl-Heinz Kamp, “Missile Defence—A Sticking Point?” The World Today, October 2011, p. 21.
4 “We cannot provide legally binding commitments, nor can we agree to limitations on missile defenses, which must necessarily keep pace with the evolu-
tion of the threat.”  Ellen Tauscher, Under Secretary of State for Arms Control and International Security, “Transatlantic Missile Defense: Phase II and the Lead 
Up to the NATO Chicago Summit,” Atlantic Council Missile Defense Conference, Washington, D.C., 18 October 2011, available at http://www.state.gov/t/
us/175693.htm
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be effective, and its failures are striking.”  It would be im-
prudent, he said, to rely on conventional military forces to 
deter nuclear, biological, and chemical threats.  Advanced 
conventional military capabilities may look like “a silver 
bullet” that could enable the Alliance to undertake further 
reductions in its nuclear capabilities, but such capabilities 
may help to provoke “asymmetric responses” that are most 
effectively deterred by nuclear forces.
A Turkish participant said that “conventional capabilities 
do not inculcate the same degree of fear inherent in nucle-
ar weapons. They leave a larger room for misinterpretation 
of their potential to deliver unacceptable damage and pu-
nishment. We should remember that NATO’s conventional 
deterrence does not function in a vacuum but under the 
overall umbrella of our nuclear deterrence.”
A Central European participant said that it would be logi-
cal in a context in which some political trends are pointing 
to a further reduction in the Alliance’s reliance on nuclear 
deterrence for the Allies to bolster and expand their con-
ventional military capabilities.  However, the financial crisis 
means that there is little chance of substantial improve-
ments in conventional military forces. 
A Lithuanian participant said that “The calls to rely more 
on conventional deterrence are all very well. The problem 
is that the conventional deterrent at least in Europe and of 
Europe is eroding rapidly. Defense expenditures are plum-
meting all over Europe.”
A French participant said, “given the budgetary constraints, 
conventional deterrence is not conceivable.”  This French 
participant quoted one of the findings of the May 2011 Tal-
linn workshop:  “The continuing decline in NATO European 
defense spending makes the achievement of reduced re-
liance on nuclear deterrence doubtful.” 
5
An American participant said that two large trends affec-
ting the conventional military forces of the NATO Allies 
are at hand.  First, an era of large-scale expeditionary ope-
rations that began with the 1990-1991 Gulf War appears 
to be coming to an end, with the projected withdrawal of 
most NATO forces from Afghanistan by 2014.  This may im-
ply reductions in conventional forces and in their operatio-
nal tempo.  Second, the financial crisis may lead to further 
defense budget and force reductions.  In this context, he 
said, the mutual dependence of the Allies will increase. 
The United States will not always be able to serve as the 
“gap filler” and “enabler” for the other Allies.  All the Allies 
will need to invest in commonly funded assets to enable 
the Alliance itself to serve as an “enabler” for operations 
and deterrence.
Another American participant said that “the need to mo-
dernize and improve our conventional capabilities is not 
an issue for the United States alone – it is a requirement of 
all of us, as Secretary Gates emphasized in his much-noted 
farewell speech here in Brussels in June. 
6
  In that regard, 
the operations now being wound down in Libya have fur-
ther revealed shortcomings in key areas of Allied capacity, 
reflecting the wave of conventional force posture, training 
and readiness cutbacks that has swept over much of Eu-
rope as the economic crisis persists and in some respects 
worsens . . . NATO must act to halt and if possible begin 
to reverse the widening ‘strategy-force mismatch’ betwe-
en the Level of Ambition (LoA) for possible future large 
and small joint missions, as that LoA was just reaffirmed 
at Lisbon, and NATO’s current and projected conventional 
capabilities.”
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A German participant said that “new capabilities such as 
missile defense imply a reduced salience of nuclear wea-
pons in the overall range of NATO capabilities.”
A French participant said that “a key point for France” holds 
that “the different elements of the mix of forces are comple-
mentary and not substitutable:  They each bring a different 
answer to our defence missions.”  Nuclear forces provide for 
“deterrence;” missile defenses for “protection and defense;” 
and conventional forces for “intervention.”  In France’s view, 
he said, nuclear deterrence “has no substitute either tech-
nically or financially speaking:  its ‘supreme guarantee’ fun-
ction cannot be compensated by ‘equivalent’ conventional 
capabilities — including missile defense —which do not 
have the same effect, at the tactical, nor at the strategic 
level. In order to preserve a credible (and robust) NATO de-
fense and deterrence posture, we cannot afford to weaken 
this unique contribution to our security.” 
7
Another French participant noted that the Allies stated in 
5 David S. Yost, Adapting NATO s Deterrence Posture: The Alliance s New Strategic Concept and Implications for Nuclear Policy, Non-Proliferation,Arms 
Control, and Disarmament: A Report on a Workshop in Tallinn, 4-6 May 2011, Rome, NATO Defense College, June 2011, p. 2, available at http://www.
ndc.nato.int/download/downloads.php?icode=294  
6 Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates, “The Security and Defense Agenda (Future of NATO),” Brussels, Belgium, 10 June 2011, available at http://www.
defense.gov/speeches/speech.aspx?speechid=1581
7   The “supreme guarantee” phrase appears in the 2010 Strategic Concept:  “The supreme guarantee of the security of the Allies is provided by the strategic 
nuclear forces of the Alliance, particularly those of the United States; the independent strategic nuclear forces of the United Kingdom and France, which
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the Lisbon Summit Declaration that “NATO will maintain 
an appropriate mix of conventional, nuclear, and missile 
defence forces,” and that “Our goal is to bolster deterrence 
as a core element of our collective defence and contribute 
to the indivisible security of the Alliance.” 
8
   In view of the-
se statements, the French participant said, “The core issue 
of the DDPR is to take into account the evolution of the 
strategic context, the risks we might face, and the respon-
sibilities we choose to take,” and on that basis to determine 
“our needs in terms of capabilities.”  Of these various capa-
bilities, “nuclear weapons make a unique contribution in 
rendering the risk of aggression unacceptable.”
A British participant said that “nuclear deterrence suffers 
from its own credibility gap for a number of reasons, not 
least an ambiguity about whether they would be used in 
a crisis because of the taboo against use and differences 
among allied attitudes to their threat.  Even with reduc-
tions in defense spending, NATO is still the most powerful 
military and security alliance in history.”  
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A Central European participant said that there are two 
commonalities among the Central and Eastern European 
Allies.  First, they concur as to the centrality of territorial 
defense as NATO’s main purpose.  These Allies have contri-
buted to NATO operations in Afghanistan, he said, with a 
“transactional” intention:  that is, to keep the United States 
committed to Article 5, the mutual defense pledge in the 
North Atlantic Treaty.  For the Baltic states in particular, the 
effectiveness of deterrence is an “existential” matter, and 
“they will want to see real capacity — conventional and 
nuclear — underpinning it.”  Second, in these countries 
many observers judge the United States “more willing to 
send soldiers to die for Tallinn or Warsaw” than any We-
stern European Ally.  In their view, the United States is the 
linchpin of Article 5’s credibility.  They understand that 
the United States is currently cutting its defense spending 
and is increasingly preoccupied with developments in the 
Asia-Pacific, but they nonetheless perceive no alternative 
superior to the United States.  For this reason Poland and 
other countries in this region attach a high value to a U.S. 
military presence on their soil.
These countries see missile defense, this Central European 
participant said, through the prism of whether it entails a 
U.S. military presence on their soil.  Poland and Romania 
want a U.S. military presence on their soil in order to ob-
tain a U.S. security guarantee “above and beyond Article 
5.”  This implies a “two-tier Article 5 system,” in which Allies 
with U.S. forces on their soil are at an advantage with an 
“Article 5+” status.  The Obama administration’s September 
2009 decision not to deploy the radar that had been sche-
duled for installation in the Czech Republic made Czechs 
feel “burned” and “aggrieved.”  The Czechs have become 
wary of U.S. choices, but they are “now negotiating with 
Washington the presence of some U.S. facility — not ne-
cessarily missile defense-related.”
With regard to the presence of U.S. nuclear weapons in 
Europe, this Central European participant said, concerned 
observers in Central and Eastern Europe are divided into 
two camps.  The first camp regards these weapons as “an 
essential glue to be preserved,” even if the systems invol-
ved are becoming “rusty” and need modernization.  The 
second camp is “less wedded” to sustaining the current nu-
clear deterrence posture based on U.S. nuclear weapons in 
Europe.  They are, he said, “reluctant to anger and alienate 
Germany,” partly for economic reasons; and this may affect 
their policies on the retention of U.S. nuclear weapons in 
Europe.
Poland is, he said, positioning itself to demand conces-
sions on transparency from Russia regarding non-strategic 
nuclear weapons while calculating that Russia will not co-
operate.  Russian obduracy means that little movement is 
possible.  In other words, Poland is counting on Russian 
intransigence to enable Warsaw to support “orthodoxy di-
sguised as flexibility.”  Some local observers are concerned 
that “NATO may end up with less nuclear as well as less 
conventional capability in and near Central Europe.”
If U.S. nuclear weapons in Europe were to be further re-
duced, this Central European participant said, the Alliance 
would have to find new ways to reaffirm the U.S. and NATO 
commitment to the security of the Central and Eastern Eu-
ropean Allies.  This might be pursued through contingency 
plans, exercises, and steps to improve NATO’s ability to fo-
resee and manage crises.  Given the concern in this region 
about the unintended escalation of a local dispute, these 
Allies need to be sure that the North Atlantic Council could 
have a deterrent role of their own, contribute to the overall deterrence and security of the Allies.” North Atlantic Council, Active Engagement, Modern De-
fence:  Strategic Concept for the Defence and Security of the Members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, 19 November 2010, par. 18, available at 
http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_68580.htm
8 North Atlantic Council, Lisbon Summit Declaration, 20 November 2010, par. 30, available at http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_68828.
htm?mode=pressrelease
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provide “a quick signal that Article 5 will be upheld.”  Doub-
ts about NATO’s responsiveness in a crisis drive the interest 
in keeping U.S. nuclear weapons in Europe and obtaining 
a greater U.S. military presence in the region.  If these Allies 
were more convinced of NATO’s crisis management capa-
city, they would feel less need for U.S. nuclear weapons in 
Europe or for U.S. missile defense installations or other U.S. 
military capabilities on their soil.
A British participant expressed uncertainty as to whether 
the NATO Allies would wish “to get involved in local ethnic 
disturbances.”
A Polish participant agreed with the prescription of im-
proved crisis management capabilities.  He said that the 
Alliance must be prepared to deal with the full spectrum 
of contingencies, including crises “below the threshold of 
aggression and war.”  To this end, NATO requires “multiple 
levels of capability, including nuclear forces.”
 DD      o  
y   c
A British participant said, “The DCAs with B61s are not 
themselves the indispensable glue of the strong transat-
lantic coupling which creates effective extended deterren-
ce.  But they are embodiments of a long-term declared col-
lective Alliance will to share, elaborately and deliberately, 
the heavy moral responsibility of escalating, if necessary, 
to nuclear violence — which, if it did not stop aggression 
against Alliance members, could lead to further nuclear 
strikes.”  
In his view, “The aspiration to Schicksalsgemeinschaft 
within the Alliance seems to be crumbling. 
9
  German po-
liticians can’t discuss the possible advantages of continu-
ing with a robust nuclear posture, without damaging their 
personal electoral credibility . . . Scandinavia and Benelux 
may be similar.  In contrast, East Europeans won’t speak up 
publicly about their anxieties and preferred remedies, be-
cause of external costs:  they risk diplomatic hostility from 
Russia, and foresee the need to keep close to Germany as 
more and more the financial hegemon in Europe.”  These 
developments could, he said, distort the decision process 
and lead to a loss of “sufficient faith in each other” and “the 
collapse of the security community concept.”
A German participant said that, “By stating its intention to 
work towards withdrawal of the remaining nuclear wea-
pons from Germany, the German government triggered a 
debate about the future of NATO’s non-strategic nuclear 
weapons in Europe. . . . Because this concerns NATO as a 
whole, we made it clear that we will not decide unilaterally 
but aim at a consensus within the Alliance.”
 A  E o a  b v  a  p   
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A German participant suggested that NATO could base its 
nuclear deterrence posture on the model of U.S. Allies in 
the Asia-Pacific.  The United States removed its nuclear we-
apons from South Korea in 1991; and Washington has sin-
ce relied on an “over the horizon” deterrent, with a capacity 
to deploy forces in the region during a crisis.
An American participant replied that experts and officials 
in Japan and South Korea are increasingly interested in 
the NATO model of nuclear sharing and consultations, and 
that a number of prominent South Koreans have expres-
sed support for a redeployment of U S. nuclear weapons in 
South Korea. 
10
   The extent to which changes in NATO’s 
nuclear deterrence posture could have a global impact on 
non-proliferation and U.S. extended deterrence should be 
regarded as a key issue for all NATO Allies.
A British participant said that U.S. allies in the Asia-Pacific 
“don’t feel much solidarity” with each other, and rely prin-
cipally on their bilateral relations with the United States in 
a “hub and spokes” arrangement.  In his view, the NATO Eu-
ropean Allies may be moving in a similar direction.  “Are we 
facing the end of the militia model of collective defense? 
Does it matter to the German/Benelux publics that people 
on the edge of the Alliance feel differently?  Shouldn’t it 
matter, as an impoverishment of the NATO ideal and as an 
issue of solidarity?” 
a  e  a  o  po   k   
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An American participant said that the nuclear risk- and 
responsibility-sharing arrangements are “central” to the Al-
liance’s meaning and purpose.  “It’s the whole idea of NATO 
that is at stake.”  The Alliance has, he said, constituted “a 
community of nations that have these weapons.”  The nu-
clear risk- and responsibility-sharing arrangements imply 
“all protecting all” in a system of “mutual defense,” instead 
9 The German word Schicksalsgemeinschaft means a community of fate, or of shared destiny.
10 For sources on this point, see David S. Yost, “The US Debate on NATO Nuclear Deterrence,” International Affairs, vol. 87, no. 6 (November 2011), pp. 1430-1431.
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of a “one way defense” of simply the U.S. extension of a nu-
clear security umbrella.  It would not be easy to abandon 
these arrangements, he said, without “disassembling the 
Alliance.”
A Lithuanian participant said, “At the end of the day, the 
NATO posture is about the DCA arrangement. If this arran-
gement goes, so does any meaningful NATO nuclear de-
terrence policy.”
A British participant said that “significant changes in the 
nuclear posture might be interpreted, inside the Alliance 
as well as beyond, as an indicator of its erosion, so that 
NATO nuclear capability was less likely to be used consi-
stently through timely consensus decisions on signaling, 
deployment, or operations.”
An American participant said that “all Allies have agreed 
that sharing nuclear risks and responsibilities is fundamen-
tal, and that we will share the burden of the nuclear mis-
sion as broadly as possible . . . The U.S. believes this must 
encompass common funding, peacetime basing, collecti-
ve planning and joint exercises, and common missions.”
A German participant noted that the Strategic Concept 
called for “the broadest possible participation of Allies in 
collective defence planning on nuclear roles, in peaceti-
me basing of nuclear forces, and in command, control and 
consultation arrangements.” 
11
  In light of this commitment, 
he asked, is it not inconsistent on Germany’s part to try to 
withdraw from its responsibilities as a host of part of the 
Alliance’s nuclear deterrence posture?  
Another German participant replied that Germany favors 
responsibility-sharing across the board, including in missi-
le defense, and that Germany’s long-term aim is the remo-
val of the U.S. nuclear weapons from Europe via a process 
of mutual U.S. and Russian reductions.
 op a  a   v   o   o  
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A Lithuanian participant said that, “Instead of a dialogue, 
there are two monologues taking place in NATO on this is-
sue.  A small group of countries – France, Turkey, Lithuania, 
Latvia, and perhaps a few other Central-Eastern European 
allies — argues that NATO has to retain nuclear deterrent 
capabilities in Europe. This narrative centers on the logic 
of security policy, defence and deterrence requirements. 
A growing disarmament movement led by Germany and 
Norway is much more vocal. This narrative centers on a 
completely different logic of security politics, diplomacy 
and disarmament.  There is little common ground between 
the two narratives. If anything, the trenches between the 
two camps are getting deeper.”
A Polish participant said that the “three no’s” in the NATO-
Russia Founding Act mean that the Allies established a 
“dual membership” system, with categories of “better and 
worse membership,” because the new Allies do not have 
the same right as the old Allies to host U.S. nuclear weapons. 
12
A British participant said that “New Europe wants these 
planes to remain in Europe largely because they don’t trust 
Old NATO Europe to defend them. . . The problem is that 
the weapons are in the wrong place.  The path dependent 
process of NATO enlargement has prevented them from 
being placed in states that would value them and want to 
maintain them.”
 p p    p c y y 
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A British participant said, “The difficulty of talking openly 
of plans and capabilities constitutes a major presentatio-
nal handicap for those arguing to retain the U.S. nuclear 
weapons in Europe.”  
A German participant said that, “Due to the range question, 
the military value of these weapons is limited or nil.” 
Another German said that the U.S. nuclear weapons in 
Europe are “no longer the right weapons in the right pla-
ce,” because Russia is now NATO’s “partner” and the only 
plausible future nuclear-armed threats are Iran and North 
Korea.
Yet another German pointed out that the range of the 
dual-capable aircraft could be readily extended by in-flight 
refuelling.  In his view, however, “For targets today, B-61 
nuclear bombs delivered by NATO dual-capable aircraft 
11 North Atlantic Council, Active Engagement, Modern Defence:  Strategic Concept for the Defence and Security of the Members of the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organisation, 19 November 2010, par. 19, available at http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_68580.htm 
12 This was a reference to a commitment by the Allies in the NATO-Russia Founding Act.  “The member States of NATO reiterate that they have no intention, 
no plan and no reason to deploy nuclear weapons on the territory of new members, nor any need to change any aspect of NATO’s nuclear posture or nu-
clear policy — and do not foresee any future need to do so.” Founding Act on Mutual Relations, Cooperation and Security between NATO and the Russian 
Federation, Paris, 27 May 1997, available at http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_25468.htm
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don’t make sense.  Would NATO fly Tornado aircraft based 
in Europe for strikes against North Korea?”
A British participant said that it is “easy to see much more 
credible scenarios than examining their utility against 
North Korea.”  In his view, “there are generic scenarios for 
the employment of theatre nuclear weapons which every-
body appreciates:  against an aggressor who might try to 
seize NATO territory, on military targets and choke points 
behind the area of entry.”
A French participant said that nuclear capabilities could 
transmit “signals of readiness and determination” for crisis 
management with a potency greater than that of “other 
means.” 
An American participant said that “all nuclear weapons are 
inherently political,” and that any operational employment 
of nuclear weapons is “almost incredible.” 
13
 However, he 
said, if someday aggression threatened the Alliance, and 
the Allies decided to respond with a nuclear strike, perhaps 
involving one or two weapons, the Allies would need to be 
“in it together” — that is, taking the decision together and 
implementing it together.  The objective in such an opera-
tion “would be to try to terminate the aggression before 
it provoked an all-out general strategic nuclear exchange.” 
For deterrence, he said, the Allies need a credible capabili-
ty to conduct such a strike.  Their aim is nonetheless never 
to get to that point, through arms control and the pursuit 
of positive political relations, as well as deterrence.
  c     o   o  
c ea  d  o   A a  sec   p c
 d e d a    c  o o  o  U  c
 po   o
A German participant said that, with reference to the U.S. 
nuclear weapons in Europe, “Given the small remaining 
numbers, the debate is more about their political value for 
Alliance cohesion and solidarity than about their real de-
terrence value.”
Another German participant said that, while the Allies have 
agreed that NATO has a continuing need for nuclear deter-
rence, “It is not carved in stone that this requires a physical 
presence of U.S. nuclear weapons in Europe.” 
In contrast, a French participant said that the Allies “have 
to take into account the ‘operational’ and military value of 
these weapons for some Allies, in addition to their symbo-
lic implications in terms of the transatlantic link, Allied soli-
darity and also nuclear sharing.”  
A Lithuanian participant said that “further degradation 
of NATO’s nuclear deterrence posture would increase the 
chances of miscalculation on the part of the potential 
enemy.”  In his view, the removal of the remaining U.S. nu-
clear weapons “would create a void and undermine the ba-
lance” with Russia.  Recent Russian exercises simulating the 
use of nuclear weapons against Poland have been “scary.” 
14
A Polish participant said that removing the remaining 
U.S. nuclear weapons in Europe would be a “quite serious” 
development.  It would mean, he said, that the European 
Allies would have to rely on U.S. nuclear weapons at sea 
or in North America, plus the nuclear weapons of Britain 
and France; and “how France would act we would never 
know.”  If the U.S. nuclear weapons were removed from Eu-
rope, “we would have a sense of less shared responsibility 
and a feeling of lessened U.S. presence on the continent. 
The political outcome would be quite serious, because it 
would create an impression that the U.S. is withdrawing 
strategically from Europe, and it could lead to unraveling 
the Alliance.”  In short, removing the U.S. nuclear weapons 
would have “enormous implications” and the Allies “have 
to be very careful” in their decision-making in this regard.
a  ag  a     w  b  a y 
po b  a  a y   v    
a a o y po y by   g v  y a
 A)  o   y a  by  
 K     S
An American participant said, “The U.S. believes one way 
for the Alliance to make progress would be for NATO, col-
lectively, to say what we all believe to be true:  that NATO 
will not use or threaten to use nuclear weapons assigned 
to NATO against non-nuclear weapons states that are par-
ty to the NPT and in compliance with their nuclear non-pro-
liferation obligations.” 
15
A German participant said that the United States and the 
United Kingdom recently revised their negative security 
13 As noted in the Alliance’s most recent Strategic Concept, “The circumstances in which any use of nuclear weapons might have to be contemplated are 
extremely remote.” North Atlantic Council, Active Engagement, Modern Defence:  Strategic Concept for the Defence and Security of the Members of the 
North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, 19 November 2010, par. 17, available at http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_68580.htm
14 See, among other sources, Jacob Kipp, “Ten Years of Anti-NATO Exercises by Russian and Belarusian Armed Forces,” Eurasia Daily Monitor, vol. 6, issue 
178, 29 September 2009; and Matthew Day, “Russia ‘Simulates’ Nuclear Attack on Poland,” The Daily Telegraph, 1 November 2009, available at http://www.
telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/poland/6480227/Russia-simulates-nuclear-attack-on-Poland.html
15 The phrase “nuclear weapons assigned to NATO” appeared in the Lisbon Summit Declaration statement commissioning the DDPR, which stated that the 
review “only applies to nuclear weapons assigned to NATO.”  This stipulation is usually construed as excluding French nuclear forces.
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assurances (NSAs) in conjunction with their nuclear postu-
re review, and that their new NSAs should “somehow” be 
reflected in NATO’s declared policy while accommodating 
French concerns.  Another German participant said that 
“NATO should align its policy with the US by clarifying that 
it does not threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-
nuclear-weapon states which are in compliance with their 
non-proliferation obligations.”  
In contrast, a French participant said, “Negative security 
assurances are given by nuclear weapons States. From the 
point of view of international law, it would be difficult to 
envisage ‘NATO owned’ NSAs.  The use of nuclear weapons 
depends, in the French deterrence policy, on a threshold 
of aggression, not on the nature of the threat. Our nucle-
ar deterrence protects us from any aggression against our 
vital interests emanating from a state — wherever it may 
come from and whatever form it may take. We could not 
therefore go in the direction of assurances based on the 
nature of the threat.”  Moreover, he said, US declaratory po-
licy “relies heavily on the US conventional pre-eminence,” 
with the U.S. Nuclear Posture Review threatening a “deva-
stating conventional military response” to the use of che-
mical or biological weapons.
16
   In his view, the NATO Allies 
are not in a similar position and “could not therefore ‘pick 
and choose’ the nuclear part of the US policy without ha-
ving the same overall capabilities.” 
So  a p    p y  o
b   o   fi  p o a  
 R a   a  c o   
 
An American participant said that the United States is 
committed to addressing the numerical disparity between 
U.S. and Russian non-strategic nuclear forces “in the next 
round of nuclear arms talks with Russia.  But before we 
would try to initiate these negotiations, we will continue 
to consult with allies on reciprocal actions that could be 
taken, for example, on the basis of parallel steps by each 
side, including as a first step, to increase transparency on 
a reciprocal basis concerning the numbers, locations, and 
types of non-strategic forces in Europe.”
A Polish participant said that the first priority should be to 
cultivate “more trust” in relations with Russia by pursuing 
transparency, information exchanges, and confidence-bu-
ilding measures regarding non-strategic nuclear forces in 
Europe.  Greater transparency would, he said, serve both 
Russian and NATO interests.  
A German participant said that the current focus of nuclear 
arms control diplomacy with Russia is to seek agreement 
on transparency and confidence-building measures con-
cerning non-strategic nuclear weapons.  The responsibility 
for establishing such measures resides with Russia and the 
United States, and Washington has made clear its interest 
in pursuing such measures.
A British participant said that transparency is highly desi-
rable but not something the Russians offer readily.  Their 
behavior over CFE is proof of this.  From a Russian perspec-
tive, transparency favors NATO, because the NATO Allies 
are already more open about their capabilities and stra-
tegic thinking than is Russia.  It is “absolutely unclear,” he 
said, that the Russians will be receptive to U.S. and NATO 
proposals for greater transparency and the establishment 
of confidence-building measures for non-strategic nuclear 
forces.  In his view, Russia particularly fears ever growing 
U.S. precision strike conventional capacities, which create 
the means for “contactless war.”  In these circumstances, 
he said, it may be impossible to design “NATO capabilities 
(presumably through new mixes of rapidly deployable 
conventional, missile defense, and cyber capabilities) in a 
manner satisfactorily reassuring to exposed allies and yet 
acceptably non-provocative to Russia.”
A German participant noted that the 2010 Strategic Con-
cept expressed the resolve of the Allies “to create the con-
ditions for further reductions” in nuclear weapons in Eu-
rope.
17 
 “To this end,” he said, “together with partners such 
as Poland, Norway and the Netherlands, we proposed to 
initiate a dialogue with Russia on confidence-building and 
transparency measures in the NATO-Russia Council.  Such 
measures could pave the way for future reductions to be 
negotiated by the US and Russia.  We expect that the DDPR 
will translate this proposal into a joint Alliance position.”
 p pa      o    
16 “In making this strengthened [negative security] assurance, the United States affirms that any state eligible for the assurance that uses CBW [chemical or 
biological weapons] against the United States or its allies and partners would face the prospect of a devastating conventional military response—and that 
any individuals responsible for the attack, whether national leaders or military commanders, would be held fully accountable.” U.S. Department of Defense, 
Nuclear Posture Review Report , Washington, D.C.:  U.S. Department of Defense, April 2010 , p. 16. 
17 North Atlantic Council, Active Engagement, Modern Defence:  Strategic Concept for the Defence and Security of the Members of the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organisation, 19 November 2010, par. 26, available at http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_68580.htm
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  po   op  wo  p o o   
c  a  p o a  o ,  o  
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A British participant said that the withdrawal of the remai-
ning U.S. nuclear weapons in Europe could enhance the 
legitimacy of the global nuclear nonproliferation regime. 
Iran has criticized the NATO countries for not carrying out 
the nuclear disarmament envisaged in Article VI of the 
NPT, he said; and removing the U.S. nuclear weapons from 
Europe could be seen as a step toward implementing Arti-
cle VI commitments.  It could therefore, he said, strengthen 
the hand of NATO and other countries in holding Iran to 
account about its NPT obligations. 
A Dutch participant said that the nonproliferation regime 
would be “boosted” if the number of states with nuclear 
weapons on their soil declined from 14 to 9, owing to the 
withdrawal of the remaining U.S. nuclear weapons in Eu-
rope.
In contrast, a Lithuanian participant said that “it is absurd 
to argue that the NATO nuclear-sharing arrangement is the 
last obstacle standing in the way of ‘zero tomorrow.’”  
An American participant said the NATO nuclear-sharing ar-
rangements were established before the conclusion of the 
Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) 
in 1968.  The legality of these arrangements was accepted 
at the time by the Soviet Union and other NPT parties.  The 
question of their consistency with the letter and spirit of 
the NPT was not raised by critics until the 1995 NPT Review 
Conference.
 p o p     o  o  
c a   o o   a  a  a , 
o   p  o a  po
An American participant said that Russia wants to con-
strain U.S. missile defenses and long-range conventional 
precision strike capabilities more than U.S. non-strategic 
nuclear forces.  The next agreement with Russia may no-
netheless concern transparency and confidence-building 
measures for non-strategic nuclear forces rather than the 
“aggregate ceiling” concept of limiting all U.S. and Russian 
nuclear forces, strategic and non-strategic, deployed and 
non-deployed.  In his view, an agreement on transparency 
and confidence-building measures could help to open the 
way to warhead verification measures, which have always 
been highly sensitive because of the possible revelation of 
vulnerabilities.
Another American participant said that an “aggregate cei-
ling” negotiation between Russia and the United States 
would be “difficult” and “protracted” and would probably 
last “quite a number of years.”
A German participant said that it will be in the interest of 
the United States and all the NATO Allies to reach agree-
ment on a DDPR that is “not too definite,” owing to its pos-
sible effect on U.S.-Russian negotiations about nuclear 
forces and related matters.  The United States may need 
“latitude” in these negotiations in order to protect U.S. and 
NATO interests.
A French participant said that bilateral arms control has 
its own logic (and its own long history) and that the NATO 
Allies of the United States have to be cautious in their sup-
port for U.S.-Russian bilateral arms control negotiations 
and the follow-up to New START.
An American participant said that the reductions of U.S. 
nuclear weapons in Europe since 1991 have been greater 
than 90 percent, but they have not brought about a paral-
lel level of Russian reciprocity.  Several factors may account 
for this, he said.  In addition to Russian assessments that 
the country’s arsenal of non-strategic nuclear weapons 
may be politically and strategically useful, the Russian 
posture may be shaped by bureaucratic inertia, technical 
incompetence, fear of NATO and other potential adversa-
ries, and a determination to maintain a capability that has 
symbolic value for Russia’s status as an independent state 
and great power.
D  a o   O A  y a o o p
  p  o   a  go a o  o  
  o  a  a
A British participant said that U.S. nuclear weapons in Eu-
rope are “irrelevant” to the strategic balance in Europe and 
“yet another symbol of European dependence on the Uni-
ted States.”  In his view, rather than keeping the U.S. nuclear 
weapons in Europe pending negotiations with Russia, the 
Allies should support removing the remaining U.S. nuclear 
weapons from Europe as a way of optimizing the Alliance 
posture and negotiating position with Russia.  NATO’s nu-
clear weapons in Europe are a liability in his view, a source 
of friction and division within the Alliance that could be 
exploited by future adversaries in a crisis.  NATO’s removal 
of nuclear weapons from Europe would, he said, encoura-
ge Russia to consider “rationalizing” its own non-strategic 
nuclear force posture and save money.  Even if the removal 
of the remaining U.S. nuclear weapons signified “a reduced 
U.S. commitment,” this simply reflects the existing reality 
and would not matter, he said, because “Europe is relati-
vely peaceful and U.S. engagement is less crucial than in 
the past.”
A Polish participant said that, in actual negotiations, “the 
Russians won’t give up weapons for nothing.”  This is ano-
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ther reason, he said, not to withdraw the U.S. nuclear wea-
pons remaining in Europe on a unilateral basis.
A Lithuanian participant said that the unilateral with-
drawal of the remaining U.S. nuclear weapons in Europe 
would cause “momentary perplexity” in Moscow, but Rus-
sia would immediately “pocket” the gesture without reci-
procity. 
An American participant said that the Alliance will need to 
support the retention of at least some U.S. nuclear wea-
pons in Europe if the United States is to have any leverage 
in negotiations with Russia about non-strategic nuclear 
forces (NSNF).  In other words, “a NATO decision to get rid 
of US NSNF now would take away any leverage on Russian 
NSNF.”
A British participant said that, rather than seeing U.S. nu-
clear weapons in Europe as instruments for leverage with 
the Russians, they might serve as an opportunity for ope-
ning a conversation with Russia about how much of a 
strategic liability many of the currently deployed nuclear 
weapons are to the security of both NATO and Russia, and 
that there is the possibility of a deal for both sides to shed 
these liabilities. 
A German participant said that there are “fundamental 
conceptual differences” between his country and France. 
Germany is, he said, wedded to arms control and disarma-
ment, because this policy approach proved itself as a “re-
cipe for national reunification” and peace; and Germany’s 
“whole philosophy” on nuclear matters stands in contrast 
to that of France.  The French, he said, owing to their “hi-
storical experience,” emphasize “national sovereignty and 
nuclear independence.”
A Lithuanian participant said that “Calls for more balance 
between deterrence and disarmament do not make any 
intellectual or conceptual sense. The concepts are quite 
simply mutually exclusive. More disarmament means less 
deterrence. Disarmament does not exactly strike fear into 
the hearts of the enemy. . . . It was an ominous sign when 
the nuclear policy directorate was moved from the De-
fense Policy division to the Emerging Security Challenges 
division at the NATO HQ. This move signifies that nuclear 
weapons are no longer seen as an inherent part of NATO’s 
defense posture but rather part of the nonproliferation 
and disarmament debate.”
A German participant said that the DDPR must take into 
account prospects for arms control, disarmament, and 
nonproliferation, despite “conceptual differences among 
the Allies” as to what may be realistically achieved in this 
domain.  NATO’s new WMD Control and Disarmament 
Committee (WCDC) may be helpful in this regard. 
18
 
A      Gove  g  C
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An American participant said that the Allied heads of state 
and government meeting in Chicago in May 2012 are likely 
to decide that “kicking the can down the road” is the wisest 
course of action.  It is prudent to postpone or avoid deci-
sions that are not yet ripe, so a decision in favor of “further 
study” and “continued consideration” might be “the best 
outcome for both the DDPR and the Chicago Summit.”  No 
consensus has formed, this American noted, for “an early 
withdrawal” of the remaining U.S. nuclear weapons in Eu-
rope, for the “indefinite retention” of the current deploy-
ment and associated nuclear risk- and responsibility-sha-
ring arrangements, or for intermediate adjustments in the 
Alliance’s nuclear deterrence posture.  There is no need for 
haste in making a decision, because the full scope life ex-
tension of the B61 will provide the weapon an additional 
20 to 30 years of operational life.  As a result, this American 
said, “until there is a decision that can be strongly endor-
sed by all members of NATO, it may be best not to come to 
a definitive conclusion.”  The main downside to delay is the 
risk that NATO nations may “allow the nuclear options to 
atrophy through lack of decision.”
Another American participant said that “kicking the can 
down the road” differs from “letting sleeping dogs lie,” be-
cause the dogs are now awake, and debate is underway, at 
least in expert and official circles.  From this perspective, 
it could be to the Alliance’s advantage to defer decisions 
until more is known about the progress of missile defen-
se programs, the prospects for transparency, confidence-
building, and arms control measures with Russia, and Iran’s 
capabilities and policies.  He noted that “key capabilities, 
from effective BMD systems to long range conventional 
strike to offensive and defensive information operations 
capabilities, have yet to be either developed or deployed, 
or both.  The current debate does not reflect this reality.  It 
would be unwise to reduce some capabilities before others 
are fully developed and integrated into NATO’s deterrence 
and defense strategy.”  Assumptions about the timing of 
18 A French participant noted that the WCDC was established in the context of the DDPR in order to support this review, and that the Allies have not yet 
decided whether it would be useful to maintain the WCDC on a permanent basis.  The Allies intend to address this question when the DDPR process is 
completed.
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the availability of new capabilities are problematic, owing 
to budgetary pressures.  It will be difficult to reach conclu-
sions at the Chicago Summit if major differences among 
the European Allies remain unresolved.
Yet another American said that the differing positions held 
by various Allies are so firmly held that at the Chicago Sum-
mit they might find themselves “right back where we were 
in Lisbon.”  The question is therefore whether consensus 
can be “pushed or carried forward,” even with wording that 
is rather “abstract.”
A British participant said that “a perception of indecision” 
in Chicago about the future direction of NATO’s deterrence 
and defense policies could be “extremely damaging” and 
“beneficial to the enemies of the Alliance.” 
In contrast, another British participant said that, given the 
gravity of the issues and the difficulties of reaching Allian-
ce consensus, it would be “no bad thing if the can is kicked 
slowly down the road — though it may need to become a 
somewhat smaller can.”  In his view, it would be advanta-
geous to keep the Alliance’s internal debate on deterrence 
matters “slow, non-populist, and boring.”
A German participant said that the topics at issue in the 
DDPR — above all, the possible use of nuclear weapons — 
could become matters of public and parliamentary debate. 
In that event, he said, NATO governments could discover, 
as with the current disputes on the future of the euro, that 
such debates do not always follow the course preferred by 
the experts.  
Another German participant said that the DDPR could lead 
not only to a policy statement at the Chicago summit, but 
also an ongoing process within the Alliance.
A Turkish participant said that the DDPR was initiated with 
the idea of “change,” but “we have to understand what we 
are doing before we change anything.”  The new Strate-
gic Concept sets out “a coherent narrative,” and the DDPR 
must be consistent with it and ensure that NATO has all the 
capabilities required for its core tasks.
